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Abstract  
The social dilemma may involve a within-person conflict, between urges to act selfishly and better 
judgment to cooperate. Examining the proposition from the perspective of temptation, we pair the 
public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (numbers on-
screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and 
impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible 
a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control—and a stronger negative 
association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results show that the representation of the 
endowment in the public good game matters for the role of self-control—and hence cooperation. 
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1. Introduction   
The social dilemma represents not only conflict between individual rationality and the collective 
good, but also a struggle within the individual—between conflicting preferences. More specifically, in 
contexts resembling that of the standard public good game (for surveys on public goods experiments, 
see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003; Gächter, 2007; Chaudhuri, 2011)—where the group is both 
abstract and anonymous—individuals may experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to 
act ‘selfishly’ and the ‘better judgment’ to act in the interest of others (Kocher et al., 2013; Martinsson 
et al., 2014). Expanding this conceptual framework, we explore here whether the representation of the 
endowment in a public good game matters for the applicability of self-control —and hence for 
cooperation. 
We adapt from Reinstein and Riener (2011) a procedure for influencing the degree to which the 
endowment is represented as tangible (physical) vs. abstract (numerical), to test the hypothesis that a 
stronger positive correlation will emerge between cooperation and self-control in the treatment that 
renders money more tangible, and hence more viscerally tempting (Loewenstein, 1996). We also test 
the converse hypothesis—that a stronger negative correlation will arise between cooperation and 
impulsivity in the treatment that renders money more tangible. Our results confirm both predictions. 
Our empirical strategy relies on a psychometric measure of individuals’ trait capacity to exercise 
self-control (Rosenbaum, 1980a), also used in two recent papers that focused on the question of self-
control conflict recognition in the public good game. Kocher et al. (2013) theorized about, and found 
evidence of, a positive association between cooperation and trait self-control among participants who 
reported feeling conflicted during the contribution decision—but not among participants who reported 
no conflict. Turning to the causality of conflict identification, Martinsson et al. (2014) fitted a subtle 
framing procedure to the public good game. They found that trait self-control was more strongly 
correlated with cooperation in the treatment that raised the relative likelihood of conflict identification 
than in the treatment that reduced the likelihood. The current paper extends the others by showing that 
the representation of the endowment in the public good game determines how self-control is related to 
cooperation. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
the relation between pro-social behavior and self-control. Section 3 presents our model, and Section 4 
outlines our experimental design. Section 5 presents the experimental results, and Section 6 discusses 
our findings and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Self-control and pro-social behavior 
2.1 Conceptualizing self-control  
There are different ways of conceptualizing self-control. A common one, on which we rely here, 
is to understand self-control as a “cold” executive function that guides behavior in response to “hot” 
impulses to act against ‘better judgment’ (see e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; 2000; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; O’Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2009). The executive function relies on 
limited resources, which we may think of as ‘willpower’ (see e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). In turn, 
the resources may include cognitive strategies to divert attention away from temptation (e.g., Mischel 
et al., 1989), strategies of pre-commitment (e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984), or, simply, 
the strength of mind to resist (e.g., Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2013).  
Perhaps not inconsistent with lay intuition, but noteworthy in light of the debate in social 
psychology about ‘disposition versus the situation,’ there is reason to think that the capacity to exert 
self-control constitutes a relatively stable personality trait. To this point, Mischel and colleagues found 
that a child’s performance at age 4 on an instant gratification task (e.g., one marshmallow now, or two 
marshmallows later) predicted later in life their cognitive control (Eigsti et al., 2006); ability to 
concentrate, self-control, interpersonal competence, SAT scores, and drug use (Mischel et al., 1988; 
Mischel et al., 1989; Shoda et al., 1990; Ayduk et al., 2000). Moreover, for the purpose of capturing 
trait self-control, a number of psychometric measures have emerged, including the Self-Control 
Schedule by Rosenbaum (1980a) and the Self-Control Scale by Tangney et al. (2004). 
The visceral nature—or ‘hotness’—of the temptation is central to most conceptualizations of 
self-control, both lay and scientific. It is thought that the immediate presence of a tempting object—
say a newly baked cookie—triggers a stronger urge than does a more abstract and distant 
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representation of the object (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In other words, the mere verbal description of 
a cookie would represent a lesser temptation than would a steaming, fresh one, standing in full 
purview of the hungry shopper. It is for this reason that numerous self-control strategies involve 
“cooling” the temptation, for example, by directing attention away from it (Mischel et al., 1989), 
rendering it more abstract and less tangible (for a review, see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), or 
undermining its perceived value (Myrseth et al., 2009). And it is for this reason that psychometric 
scales of trait self-control ask individuals about their tendencies (among other things) to engage in 
such behaviors (e.g., Rosenbaum, 1980a). 
 
2.2 Self-control and social dilemmas 
Loewenstein (1996; 2000), followed by O’Donoghue and Loewenstein (2007), suggest that 
visceral urges or drive-states may motivate ‘selfish’ behavior, and a growing body of empirical work 
indicates that this could be the case. Most pertinent to our present purposes is the work on cooperation 
in social dilemmas (for a review of social dilemmas, see van Lange et al., 2013). 
Several studies have examined the relationship between time preferences and cooperation. 
Curry et al. (2008) found in a standard public good game that discount rates were negatively 
associated with contributions to the public good. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) elicited time preferences 
of fishermen in the lab; they found that patient (vs. impatient) fishermen exhibited more cooperative 
behavior in the field, but they found no relationship in the lab. Jones and Rachlin (2009), however, 
find no correlation between temporal discounting and cooperation in a 100-person public good 
game—but it involved a purely hypothetical scenario, with no monetary incentives. Furthermore, 
Burks et al. (2009) report that “short-term” patience—the β in the β-δ model—is positively associated 
with cooperative behavior in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma.1, Overall, then, preferences for the 
present over the future seem to be associated with more selfish as opposed to cooperative behavior. 
                                                
1 There is an extensive literature on self-control and time inconsistency in economics; see e.g. hyperbolic and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting models by Strotz (1955) and Laibson (1997), the “planner-doer” model by Thaler 
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The literature on response times and cooperation, however, paints a conflicting picture. In 
several studies, shorter decision times are associated with more cooperative behavior (Rand et al., 
2012; Lotito et al., 2013; Rand et al. 2014)—even when such cooperation is conditional on that of the 
other players (Nielsen et al., 2013)—and treatments intended to reduce decision times boost 
cooperation (Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al. 2014).2 Tinghög et al. (2013), however, fail to observe an 
effect of time pressure on cooperation, as do Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014). Moreover, Lohse et 
al. (2014) report the opposite pattern—that longer decision times are associated with more cooperative 
behavior.3 Further, if we were to view the time pressure treatment as one that influences cognitive 
resources, it would be relevant to note that Duffy and Smith (2014) report no consistent effect of 
cognitive load—meant to impair self-control by depleting cognitive resources—on outcomes across 
treatments, in a repeated multi-player prisoner’s dilemma. We thus conclude that the precise role of 
cognitive resources in determining selfish versus cooperative behavior remains unclear. 
Setting out to explore self-control in cooperation, Kocher et al. (2013) formulate and test a 
model in a one-shot, linear public good game; they examine the association between cooperation, self-
control, risk-preferences, and the contributions of other players. Consistent with their predictions, 
cooperation is positively associated with a psychometric measure of trait self-control (Rosenbaum, 
1980a), and this association is moderated by an interaction with risk-preferences; higher risk aversion 
implied a weaker association. Moreover, they find that this interaction is moderated by the degree of 
cooperation of other players, captured by the conditional cooperation schedule from the strategy 
method; individuals feel obliged to contribute, and to expend costly effort in this pursuit, to the extent 
that others are also contributing to the public good. Finally, and also consistent with their model, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
and Shefrin (1981), and the dual-self model by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). For work on procrastination, see 
e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin, (1999) and Burger et al. (2011). 
2 For a general discussion on the merit of response times in economics, see Rubinstein (2007; 2013). 
3 Recent work by Recalde et al. (2014) argues that the negative correlation observed between decision times and 
contribution reflects confused participants, who quickly select contributions that on average lie in the middle of 
strategy space. 
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aforementioned patterns were obtained for individuals who reported feeling conflicted during the 
decision to cooperate—not for those who reported no conflict whatsoever. Notably, their study did not 
feature any experimental treatments, and so it left empirical questions of causality unanswered. 
Martinsson et al. (2014) explore one of these questions, namely that of identification of self-
control conflict. Borrowing an experimental framing procedure from Myrseth and Fishbach (2010), 
also recently adapted by Martinsson et al. (2012) to a dictator game, they attempted to influence 
identification of self-control conflict in a one-shot, linear public good game.4 Consistent with their 
predictions, the frame hypothesized to promote identification of self-control conflict—relative to that 
hypothesized not to—yielded a stronger positive correlation between cooperation and trait self-control. 
This effect was obtained both for unconditional and conditional cooperation, and, in the latter case, it 
was stronger for higher levels of others’ contributions. 
The present paper presents a modified version of the self-control model from Kocher et al. 
(2013), by explicitly incorporating temptation strength, and it examines empirically in a one-shot 
public good game a new question of causality—that concerning the strength of temptation.  
 
2.3 Self-control and dictator games 
Most studies on dictator games that speak to the role of self-control have done so by measuring 
or manipulating cognitive resources, broadly conceived. Piovesan and Wengstrӧm (2009) find that 
lower response times of participants in a repeated dictator game, which lasts 24 periods, are correlated 
with more selfish choices, both across and within participants. These results permit the interpretation 
that individuals’ default behavior is to act in self-interest, and that pro-social behavior necessitates the 
successful resolution of a self-control conflict, which is time-consuming and requires cognitive 
resources. Consistent with this idea, Achtziger et al. (2015) find in a repeated dictator game that 
                                                
4 The hypothesized mechanism behind their procedure is consistent with the “logic of appropriateness” 
framework, which assumes that individuals ask themselves, “What does a person like me do in a situation like 
this (e.g., March, 1994; Messick, 1999; Weber et al., 2004)?” It can then be viewed as specifying when a 
particular logic of appropriateness is activated, thereby activating a self-control conflict.   
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cognitive depletion reduced giving. Moreover, giving declined with rounds, consistent with the notion 
that cognitive resources were depleted as individuals progressed through the game. However, Hauge et 
al. (2009) report no effect of cognitive load on players in one-shot dictator games, and Cornellisen et 
al. (2011), find no main effect of cognitive load across three low-stake, one-shot dictator games. 
Breaking down the data, however, Cornellisen et al. (2011) report that cognitive load increased giving 
among individuals classified as “pro-socials” according to Liebrand’s (1984) measure of social value 
orientation (social preferences), but that there was no effect among the majority of participants, 
classified as “pro-selves.” Schulz et al. (2014) report that cognitive load raised the proportion of 
altruistic choices in a repeated “mini-dictator game,” where participants faced dichotomous choices, 
between “fair” and “unfair” allocations. 
Taking a different approach, Martinsson et al. (2012) show that donations to the Red Cross in a 
one-shot dictator game are positively correlated with participants’ scores on the Rosenbaum (1980a) 
measure of trait self-control. Notably, the correlation was obtained in the treatment that was expected 
to raise the relative likelihood of identification of self-control conflict, but not in that which was 
expected to reduce the likelihood. Aguilar-Pardo et al. (2013) obtain consistent results; young children 
who engaged in altruistic sharing in a dictator game exhibited later higher scores on an inhibitory 
control task, a measure of executive functioning. While studies of dictator games have produced mixed 
results, the emerging picture is that self-control facilitates giving. 
 
3. Predictions 
3.1 Utility 
We assume an agent whose preferences are described by the utility function Ui, which consists 
of three components: 
     𝑈! = 𝑢! 𝜋! − 𝑠! 𝑐! + 𝑓!(𝑐!)  (1) 
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The first component, ui(πi), is the utility from monetary payoffs. For simplicity, we assume that 
utility is linear in payoffs, and that the utility from monetary payoffs is equivalent to the payoff itself, 
ui(πi) = πi. Our empirical setting is a one-shot linear public goods game, where πi is the payoff, ei the 
endowment, ci the contribution level, and m the marginal return from the public good: 
 
 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 +𝑚 ∙ 𝑐𝑗𝑛 .𝑛𝑗=1  (2) 
 
 
If 0 < m/n < 1 and m > 1, this payoff function satisfies the requirements of a public good.  
The second component, 𝑠! 𝑐! , specifies the cost of exercising self-control. This cost is 
“opportunity-based,” following Fudenberg and Levine (2006). The underlying idea is that temptation 
strength is proportional to the appeal of available alternatives and that cost of self-control is 
monotonically and positively related to temptation strength. In our case, greed grows stronger with a 
greater difference between the highest possible available monetary payoff. Since ci = 0 maximizes 
monetary payoff, any positive contribution level ci´ reduces the monetary payoff, and hence π(0) > 
π(ci´), for ci´ > 0. We may write the difference between the two payoffs as the difference between the 
payoff function evaluated at zero and the payoff function itself. This quantity then becomes   π(0) - 
π(ci´) = ci – mci /n= (1 – m/n)ci. The term (1 – m/n)ci therefore denotes greed and is the  argument of 
the self-control cost function.  Assuming a standard quadratic functional form, we may write the cost 
of self-control as 
 𝑠𝑖 𝑐! = 𝑡 1−𝑚/𝑛 𝑐𝑖 22𝜔𝑖  (3) 
 
 
where the self-control cost is moderated by a will-power parameter ωi > 0. The parameter  
measures the tangibility of monetary rewards, capturing the idea that more tangible objects are also 
more viscerally tempting (see e.g., Lowenstein, 1996; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  
The third and final component in (1), specifies an intrinsic benefit from contributing, 
similar to impure altruism models (e.g., Andreoni, 1990). 
 , (4) 
0t >
( )i if c
( )i i i if c cα=
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where αi > 0 is a utility weight capturing the importance of contributing.  
The motivation behind our modeling approach is to describe an agent with altruistic 
motivations, but who nevertheless feels tempted to be selfish. That is, the agent experiences a self-
control conflict between her better judgment to act pro-socially and the temptation to act selfishly. To 
resolve this self-control conflict, the agent must expend costly effort. This effort is modeled with the 
approach by Fudenberg and Levine (2006), and implemented into the utility function accordingly.5  
We state the utility function in full as     𝑈𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 +𝑚 ∙ 𝑐𝑗𝑛 −𝑛𝑗=1 𝑡 1−𝑚/𝑛 𝑐𝑖 22𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖 (5) 
 
 
3.2 Predictions 
We present here the main behavioral predictions for the public goods game. Maximization of the 
utility function in (5), with respect to  and solving for , leads to our main prediction.  
 
PREDICTION 1.  Given that the individual is sufficiently prosocial, such that  , raising 
tangibility of the allocation reduces optimal contributions in the public goods game more for lower 
than for higher levels of self-control.  
 
Proof. in Appendix A.  
 
 Impulsivity refers to the tendency to act spontaneously according to impulse, without carefully 
considering whether the act is in line with long-term goals or better judgment (e.g., Baumeister, 2002). 
                                                
5The model presented in Kocher et al. (2013) also includes risk preferences specified over monetary payoffs, but 
does not account for temptation strength. Also, the pro-social component is modelled as depending on mean 
contributions of others’ while here it is a constant. Hauge (2010) employs a similar modeling approach for the 
dictator game.  
ic
*
ic
1i
m
n
α > −
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While impulsive behavior does not necessarily run counter to better judgment, it often does. Because 
impulsivity, therefore, ought to be negatively correlated with self-control, we predict the following: 
 
PREDICTION 2.  Given that the individual is sufficiently prosocial, such that , raising 
tangibility of the allocation reduces optimal contributions in the public goods game more for higher 
than for lower levels of impulsivity.  
 
We illustrate our predictions graphically in Figure 1. Prediction 1 implies that the two lines converge 
with higher levels of self-control. Prediction 2, however, implies that the two lines diverge with higher 
levels of impulsivity. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
4. Experimental design and procedure 
4.1 The public goods game 
Our experiment features a one-shot public good game, with the following linear payoff function 
for individual i
    
 𝜋! = 10− 𝑐! + 0.4 𝑐! ,!!     (6) 
where ci denotes the contribution of individual i to the public good. Each individual is assigned 
to a group of four randomly matched individuals, and each individual receives an endowment of 10 
experimental points (the experimental currency unit). The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from 
investing in the public good is 0.4, which satisfies the requirements of a social dilemma. Assuming 
that participants are rational and self-interested, any MPCR < 1 implies a dominant strategy to free-
ride. Because MPCR⋅n > 1, it is from the perspective of social welfare optimal to contribute the entire 
endowment. 
1i
m
n
α > −
4    
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Our experiment incorporates the preference elicitation and incentive mechanism from 
Fischbacher et al. (2001), which includes a version of the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967). 
Participants make two sets of decisions—first, an unconditional contribution to the public good and, 
second, a conditional contribution schedule. The unconditional contribution is given as a single 
integer, satisfying 0 ≤ ci ≤ 10. For the conditional contribution, participants indicate how much they 
would contribute to the public good for any possible average contribution (rounded to integers) of the 
other three players within their group. For each of the 11 possible averages from 0 to 10, participants 
decide on a contribution between (and including) 0 and 10.  
Both the unconditional and the conditional contributions are potentially payoff-relevant, 
ensuring incentive-compatibility The conditional contribution schedule determines the payoff for one 
group member, randomly selected by the toss of a four-sided die.6 Unconditional contributions 
determine the payoffs for the other three group members. Together, the three unconditional 
contributions within a group, and the corresponding conditional contribution, constitute total 
contributions to the public good. 
 
4.2 Treatments 
Our experiment features three between-subject treatments—the cash, token, and standard 
treatments. The purpose of the treatments was to influence the degree to which the endowment and the 
allocation, the sources of temptation, were tangible. Each of the nine sessions was assigned to one of 
the three treatments, and participants were randomly assigned to one of the nine sessions.  
The treatments were implemented with a procedure adopted from Reinstein and Riener (2011). 
In the cash treatment, participants received their endowment in the form of one-euro coins, packaged 
in envelopes, one for each participant. Participants were instructed to indicate their allocation decision 
on the computer screen and by allocating the coins to two new envelopes, one marked for self and the 
other for the public good. Participants’ payments at the end of the experiment were determined by the 
                                                
6 Each group member is assigned a number from one to four. The die is rolled by a randomly selected participant 
in the session, and the roll of the die is monitored by the experimenter. 
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on-screen decision. Similarly, participants in the token treatment received their endowment in the form 
of ten tokens, packaged in one envelope for each participant. Otherwise, the procedure in the token 
treatment resembled that in the cash treatment. In contrast, participants in the standard treatment 
completed the entire decision process on-screen, using z-Tree, without receiving any envelopes or any 
forms of physical representation of their endowments. As such, the baseline treatment followed the 
procedure typically used in linear public good games (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Zelmer, 2003). 
The crucial distinction between the three conditions is the physical—and hence tangible—
representation of the endowment and the allocation. We assumed that a more tangible representation 
of the source of temptation would more likely stoke stronger feelings of greed. This assumption is 
consistent with work on visceral influences (Loewenstein, 1996; O’Donoghue & Loewenstein, 2007); 
studies showing that those paying by credit card spend more than those paying cash (Hirschman, 
1979); and that consumers who pay be credit card tip more than those who pay by cash (for a review, 
see Lynn & McCall, 2000). As the cash condition represents the most tangible representation of the 
endowment and the allocation, we expected this condition to ignite the strongest visceral influences, or 
temptation. In contrast, the standard treatment provides merely an abstract representation of the 
endowment and the allocation. We thus expected this treatment to elicit the weakest temptation. 
Consistent with our interpretation, Reinstein and Riener (2011) found that charitable donations were 
lower in the cash than in the standard treatment. Finally, while the token treatment provides a physical 
representation of the endowment and the allocation, the representation is more abstract than is that of 
the cash treatment. We thus expected the token treatment to fall somewhere between the cash and the 
standard treatments. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
4.3 Measurement of trait self-control and impulsivity 
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To measure self-control, we implemented the Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (Rosenbaum, 
1980a), henceforth abbreviated Rosenbaum.7 This is a standard psychometric measure of trait self-
control in the psychology literature. It has been validated against a number of relevant personality 
measures; and against behavioral tasks related to self-control, such as resisting pain (Rosenbaum, 
1980b); coping with seasickness (Rosenbaum & Rolnick, 1983); mental disability (Rosenbaum & 
Palmon, 1984); stress (Rosenbaum & Smira, 1986; Rosenbaum, 1989); quitting smoking (Katz & 
Singh, 1986); saving over spending (Romal & Kaplan, 1995); and curtailing procrastination (Milgram 
et al., 1988). More recently, the Rosenbaum has been found under certain conditions to correlate 
positively with donations in a dictator game (Martinsson et al., 2012) and cooperation in a one-shot 
public good game (Kocher et al., 2013; Martinsson et al., 2014). 
We also included a measure of impulsivity, adopted from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP; Wagner et al., 2007). It consists of one question: “How do you assess yourself personally: 
Are you in general a person who thinks carefully before acting, so not impulsive at all? Or are you a 
person who acts without thinking long, so very impulsive?” The question was answered on an 11-point 
scale, ranging from “not impulsive at all” (0) to “very impulsive” (10).  
 
 
4.4 Overview of procedure 
We conducted the computer-based experiment in the experimental laboratory at Technische 
Universitӓt Berlin, in December 2010, with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In 
total, 180 students from all disciplines, except economics, participated in nine sessions—three sessions 
for each treatment—with 20 participants per session. Nobody participated in more than one 
experimental session, and they were randomly assigned to treatments. Approximately 66% of 
                                                
7 The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule (1980a) is included in Appendix B. 
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participants were male. Sessions lasted up to 1½ hours, and the average payoff was 12.9 euro, 
including a show-up fee of 4 euro.8 
Experimental participants were arranged in separate cubicles upon arrival. Each session started 
with instructions for the public goods game. The instructions also indicated that there would be 
additional parts of the experiment, but that the instructions for these parts would only be provided after 
the completion of the current part. It was further stressed to participants that decisions in one part 
would be completely unrelated to those in the other parts. Participants received neutrally framed, 
written instructions (see Appendix B), on-screen and on paper. The instructions were read out loud by 
the experimenter, who was overseeing the execution of the experiment, but not otherwise involved 
with the research project. Everybody had the opportunity to ask questions in private. The experiment 
continued only after all participants had completed a series of computerized exercises (where they 
calculated profits for different contribution levels in the public goods game), and after all participants 
had correctly understood the procedures. Participants were informed that feedback and payment would 
only be provided at the very end of the experiment.  
After finishing the public goods game, participants completed the Rosenbaum, the measure of 
impulsivity, and some demographic questions. 
The final stage of the experiment included feedback on the decisions of group members in the 
public goods game and on the individual earnings. Payments were made privately and in cash. 
 
 
5. Experimental results 
Table 1 and 2 show that unconditional and conditional contributions, respectively, resemble 
those reported elsewhere (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher & Gächter, 2010), including 
studies that investigated the relationship between cooperation and self-control (Kocher et al., 2013; 
                                                
8 Each experimental point earned in the public goods game was exchanged at the pre-announced rate of 1 point = 
0.33 euro. 
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Martinsson et al., 2014).9 Also, the Rosenbaum scores correspond roughly to those found in other 
studies.10 The age profile fits that of a typical student population (M = 23.3, SD = 4.1). 
 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 indicates no differences in distributions of contributions, unconditional or conditional, 
between treatments. However, differences do arise in the distributions of age and gender, though these 
are only significant at the 0.1-level. It is worth noting the difference in Impulsivity scores between the 
cash and standard treatments, also significant only at the 0.1-level. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
  
We focus our analysis on unconditional contributions as our tangibility treatments were 
implemented only for this decision task; participants were given cash or tokens to represent the 
endowment and their unconditional contributions. Any treatment effect on conditional contributions 
would, therefore, amount to a priming or “carry-over” effect. 
                                                
9 In the cash and token treatments, participants were instructed to indicate their contributions in two ways, first 
by placing the cash or tokens in an envelope and second by indicating the same amount on a computer screen. 
The experimenter did not report any discrepancies between these sums, indicating that participants followed the 
instructions. .  
10 The mean of the pooled sample is below the corresponding range of means from the original samples studied 
by Rosenbaum (1980a, b)—M = 18.5 vs. M’s ranging from 23 to 27. It is slightly above that obtained in 
Germany by Kocher et al. (2012) (M= 16.7), but below those obtained in Colombia by Martinsson et al. (2012; 
forthcoming, respectively) (M = 32.1 and M = 29.7). 
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Table 4 presents a regression analysis of the effect of treatments on unconditional contributions, 
taking the standard treatment as the baseline.11 Specifications (3) and (4) include interaction terms for 
the treatments and the Rosenbaum measure, specification (4) adding controls for age and gender 
(significant at levels 0.05 and 0.1, respectively), specification (3) excluding these. Because of the 
imbalance of age and gender across treatments, we focus our discussion on specification (4). We test 
prediction 1—that raising the tangibility of the allocation will reduce optimal cooperation more for 
those with lower levels of self-control—by inspecting whether the coefficients on the two treatment 
dummies are negative, and whether interaction terms between treatments and Rosenbaum are positive. 
Negative coefficients on the treatment dummies would imply that the treatments reduce cooperation 
for individuals with little self-control, and positive interaction coefficients would imply that this 
reduction grows smaller for individuals with higher levels of self-control. Indeed, we find support for 
prediction 1. The coefficients on the token and cash treatments are negative and significant by one-
tailed tests; and (t = 1.83, p < 0.05; t = 1.52, p < 0.1, respectively), and the coefficients on both 
interaction terms, for Rosenbaum and token and for Rosenbaum and cash, are positive and significant 
by one-tailed tests (t = 1.92, p < 0.05; t = 1.65, p < 0.05, respectively). We find no difference between 
the two interaction terms ((χ2(1) = 0.10, p > 0.1). These results are of economic significance. In 
specification (4), a one standard deviation increase in the Rosenbaum is associated with an 
approximate 11% and 7% boost in contributions in the token and cash treatments, respectively.   
In contrast, the main effect of the Rosenbaum in specification (4) is non-significant (t = 1.11, p 
> 0.1). This means that there is no discernable statistical association between Rosenbaum and 
contributions in the standard treatment. Moreover, when testing whether the association between the 
Rosenbaum and contributions in the cash treatment is greater than that in the standard treatment—by 
comparing the sum of the coefficient on the cash-Rosenbaum interaction and the coefficient on the 
                                                
11 We use a negative binomial regression model, as our data is over-dispersed; in each of the treatments, the 
variance of the raw data is much larger than the mean. This violates the assumption of equal variance, as 
confirmed by a Likelihood-ratio test, which rejects the null hypothesis that Poisson is the appropriate 
specification. OLS and Tobit regressions, available in Appendix B, yield very similar results.  
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Rosenbaum main effect to the coefficient on the Rosenbaum main effect alone—we obtain 
significance (χ2(1) = 1.68, p < 0.1). The corresponding test for the comparison of the association 
between Rosenbaum and contributions in the token treatment to that in the standard treatment is also 
significant (χ2(1) = 2.56, p < 0.1). A more tangible representation of the allocation appears to cause a 
stronger positive association between self-control and cooperation.  
We summarize our findings in Result 1, according to Prediction 1: 
 
RESULT 1: The treatments that render the allocation ‘tangible’ reduce cooperation more for low than 
for high levels of self-control.. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
We plot in Figure 2 the predicted values of contributions based on specification (4) as a function 
of the Rosenbaum, and broken down by treatments. In line with our theoretical predictions, illustrated 
in Figure 1, we observe that the lines for the cash and standard treatments converge with higher levels 
of the Rosenbaum.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Before turning to Prediction 2, which concerns the relationship between cooperation and 
impulsivity, we test whether our measures of self-control and impulsivity are negatively correlated. 
Indeed they are (R = -0.26, p < 0.01), as expected.  
 Specifications (5) and (6) in Table 4 include interaction terms for the treatments and the 
Impulsivity measure, specification (6) including controls for age and gender (significant at levels 0.05 
and 0.1, respectively), specification (5) excluding these. Because of the imbalance of age and gender 
across treatments, we focus our discussion on specification (6). We test prediction 2—that raising the 
tangibility of the allocation will reduce optimal cooperation more for those with higher levels of 
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impulsivity—by inspecting whether the coefficients on the two treatment dummies are significantly 
different from zero, and whether interaction terms between treatments and Impulsivity are negative. 
Should the coefficients on the treatment dummies not differ from zero, it would imply that the 
treatments fail to reduce cooperation for individuals with little impulsivity; negative interaction 
coefficients would imply that a reduction grows with higher levels of impulsivity. Indeed, we find 
support for prediction 2. The coefficients on the token and cash treatments are both non-significant (t 
= 0.12, p > 0.1; t = 1.44, p > 0.1, respectively), and, although the coefficient on the interaction 
between Impulsivity and token is non-significant (t = 0.33, p > 0.1), that on the interaction between 
Impulsivity and cash is negative and significant by a one-tailed test (t = 1.97, p < 0.05). The latter 
result is of economic significance. In specification (6), a one standard deviation increase in the 
impulsivity measure is associated with a 16% reduction in contributions.   
In contrast, the main effect of Impulsivity in specification (6) is non-significant (t = 0.96, p > 
0.1). This means that there is no discernable statistical association between Impulsivity and 
contributions in the standard treatment. Moreover, when testing whether the association between 
Impulsivity and contributions in the cash treatment is greater than that in the standard treatment—by 
comparing the sum of the coefficient on the cash-Impulsivity interaction and the coefficient on the 
Impulsivity main effect to the coefficient on the Impulsivity main effect alone—we obtain significance 
(χ2(1)= 3.65, p < 0.05). A more tangible representation of the allocation appears to cause a stronger 
negative association between impulsivity and cooperation.  
We summarize our findings in Result 2, according to Prediction 2: 
 
RESULT 2: The cash treatment, which renders the allocation ‘tangible’, reduces cooperation more 
for high than for low levels of impulsivity. The token treatment, also thought to render the allocation 
tangible (but less so than cash), exhibits no effect. 
 
We plot in Figure 3 the predicted values of contributions based on specification (6) as a function 
of Impulsivity, and broken down by treatments. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, illustrated 
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in Figure 1, we observe that the lines for the cash and standard treatments diverge with higher levels of 
Impulsivity. 
We fail to observe any carry-over effects to conditional contributions. While it is hard to know 
what this means, it would be consistent with the notion that our treatment effects act through the 
representation of the allocation more so than they do through representation of the endowment, per se.   
 
 
6. Discussion 
This paper has explored whether the representation of the endowment in a public good game 
influences cooperation. We find that it does—by influencing the applicability of self-control. 
Specifically, cooperation is more tightly associated with self-control when an individual’s endowment 
is represented as tangible as opposed to abstract. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that a tangible 
representation of the endowment more likely stokes the temptation of greed, against which self-control 
would be exerted for the better judgment of acting in the interest of the common good. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we find in a public good game that individuals’ trait self-control is positively 
correlated with cooperation when the endowment is represented physically, in coins or tokens, but not 
when represented abstractly, i.e., numerically on the computer screen. Moreover, individuals’ reported 
impulsivity is negatively correlated with contributions when the endowment is represented in coins, 
but not when represented on the computer screen or in tokens.   
Our results add to an ongoing line of research that explores how individuals in social interaction 
act on the basis of ostensibly conflicting preferences. It follows Martinsson et al. (2012) in exploring 
the idea that the question of pro-social versus selfish behavior in general may represent one of self-
control. And it follows Kocher et al. (2013) and Martinsson et al. (2014) in extending this conceptual 
framework to the social dilemma. While the aforementioned papers either measured experience of 
self-control conflict or experimentally manipulated it, this paper has focused on experimental 
variations of temptation. Moreover, while capturing self-control with the Rosenbaum (1980a) scale—
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like the aforementioned papers—this paper, unlike the others, also provides converging evidence with 
a measure of impulsivity (GSOEP, Wagner et al., 2007). 
Conceptually speaking, our results are consistent with other findings in the literature on 
cooperation, most notably that contributions to the public good are negatively associated with discount 
rates (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011). However, our results challenge the hypothesis 
recently advanced by Rand et al. (2012), that “our first impulse is to cooperate.” Specifically, Rand et 
al. (2012) argue that cooperation represents the “default” behavioral response in social dilemmas—the 
option chosen in the absence of cognitive resources required for conscious (“System 2”) processing. 
They find support for their hypothesis with a series of one-shot public good games in which lower 
reaction times are associated with higher levels of cooperation, and in which decision time 
manipulations influence cooperation. It is hard to reconcile our cash treatment effect—and its 
moderation by both self-control and impulsivity measures—with a story that posits cooperation as the 
generally spontaneous mode of behavior. 
It may be worth noting the relation between the results obtained here and those found in studies 
on different types of payment modes. Set in consumer behavior contexts rather than stylized games of 
cooperation, these studies indicate that consumers spend more by abstract modes of payment—such as 
credit cards and “monopoly money”—than they do by cash (e.g., Hirschman, 1979; Soman, 2003; 
Raghubir & Srivasta, 2008). This pattern is consistent with the conceptual framework explored in our 
paper. What is more, several studies find that individuals in restaurants tip more when their payment 
mode is credit card than when it is cash (for a review, see Lynn & McCall, 2000). Our framework and 
empirical results invite a field study: self-control should be a stronger predictor of tipping behavior 
when the payment is made by cash than when made by more abstract representations of currency, such 
as credit cards, debit cards, or gift certificates. 
This paper has relied on the strategy of influencing the degree to which the endowment and the 
allocation—the source of temptation—is tangible or abstract. As such, it has rendered individuals’ 
aptitude at self-control more or less relevant to the decision context. Future work might consider 
pairing this treatment with one that influences the degree to which the object of altruism is concrete or 
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abstract. In our context, the object of altruism—the common good—is highly abstract; a more concrete 
representation, such as an image of the beneficiaries, might flip the psychological experience of the 
decision problem. It is quite possible that the concrete object of altruism would stoke feelings of 
empathy (e. g., Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut & Ritov, 2005). The self-control conflict may then 
stand between the better judgment to act in self-interest and the temptation to act in the interest of 
others.  
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Appendix A: Proof of Prediction 1. 
 
Recall the agent’s utility function:      𝑈𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 +𝑚 ∙ 𝑐𝑗𝑛 −𝑛1 𝑡 1−𝑚/𝑛 𝑐𝑖 22𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖 
 
Maximization with respect to yields the first order condition 
 −1+𝑚𝑛 − 𝑡 1−𝑚/𝑛 !𝑐!𝜔! + 𝛼! 
 
and hence optimal contribution  is given by 
 
 𝑐𝑖∗ = 𝜔𝑖𝑡2 𝛼𝑖 − 1+𝑚/𝑛1−𝑚/𝑛 2 . 
 
 
The derivative  is then  
 𝜕𝑐𝑖∗𝜕𝑡 = −2𝜔𝑖 𝛼𝑖 − 1+𝑚/𝑛 𝑡−3 1−𝑚/𝑛 −2 
  
Which is negative if  
 
 
That is, the marginal benefit of contributing is larger than the marginal cost of contributing.    
Furthermore, the derivative      𝜕𝑐𝑖∗2𝜕𝑡𝜕𝜔𝑖 = −2 𝛼𝑖 − 1+𝑚/𝑛 𝑡−3 1−𝑚/𝑛 −2 
 
is negative if    
That is, if the marginal benefit of contributing is larger than the marginal cost of contributing.  
This demonstrates that the negative effect of increasing tangibility on optimal contributions is  
reduced as willpower increases. This proves the prediction.  
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Figures and Tables  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable 
  
Pooled 
sample   
Standard 
treatment 
Token 
treatment 
Cash 
treatment 
Kruskal-
Wallis pB 
Unconditional contribution 
 
4.69   4.77  4.58 4.73   0.9710 
  
(180, 3.27)  (60, 3.41) (60, 3.34) (60, 3.11)  
Conditional contributionA 
 
3.05   2.92  3.09  3.14   0.3136 
  
(1980, 3.41)  (660, 3.33) (660, 3.43) (660, 3.46)  
Rosenbaum 
 
18.46 
 
19.55  19.15  16.68  0.8664 
  
(180, 21.69) 
 
(60, 20.02) (60, 20.56) (60, 24.46) 
 Impulsivity 
 
4.37  
 
4.17  4.80  4.92   0.1785 
  
(180, 2.23) 
 
(60, 2.32) (60, 2.23) (60, 2.09) 
 Male (1 if male) 
 
0.66  
 
0.72 0.68  0.57  0.1941 
  
(180, 0.47) 
 
(60, 0.45) (60, 0.47) (60, 0.50) 
 Age 
 
23.27  
 
22.7 0 23.70 23.42  0.1432 
    (180, 4.08)   (60, 3.56) (60, 3.92) (60, 4.69)   
Note: Number of observations and standard deviations in parentheses (n, SD); A = created using the 
strategy method. B = H0:  No difference in distributions across treatments;  
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Table 2. Fractions of contributor type by treatment. 
Contributor type Baseline treatment Token treatment Cash treatment 
Conditional cooperator 46.67 
 
55.00 
 
46.67 
 Freerider 25.00 
 
21.67 
 
20.00 
 Humpshape contributor 8.33 
 
6.67 
 
15.00 
 Others 20.00 
 
16.67 
 
18.33 
 Note: Classifications follow those of Fischbacher et al. (2001). Individuals are also classified as 
conditional cooperators if the relationship between own and others’ average contributions is positive 
and significant at the 1% significance level, based on the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (see 
e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). 
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Table 3. Pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests 
  
Mann-Whitney p-value 
Variable 
  
Standard vs. 
Token treatment   
Standard vs. 
Cash treatment   
Token vs.       
Cash treatment 
Unconditional contribution 
 
0.8280 
 
0.9472 
 
0.8470 
Conditional contributionA 
 
0.2392 
 
0.1576 
 
0.7369 
Rosenbaum 
 
0.8071 
 
0.7889 
 
0.5851 
Impulsivity 
 
0.1382 
 
0.0871 
 
0.8528 
Male (1 if male) 
 
0.6916 
 
0.0880 
 
0.1887 
Age   0.0557   0.2434   0.3712 
Note: H0: No difference in populations. A = created using the strategy method. 
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Table 4. Negative binomial regression results 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. 
Token treatment  -0.039  -0.087 -0.281 -0.344* 0.115 0.044 
 
(0.30) (0.65) (1.53) (1.83) (0.33) (0.12) 
Cash treatment  -0.007  -0.059 -0.255 -0.258 0.651** 0.477 
 
(0.06) (0.47) (1.46) (1.52) (2.05) (1.44) 
Rosenbaum    -0.007  -0.008 
  
 
  (1.35) (1.11) 
  Rosenbaum x token treatment 
  
0.013* 0.013* 
  
   
(1.88) (1.90) 
  Rosenbaum x cash treatment 
  
0.014** 0.011* 
  
   
(2.08) (1.65) 
  Impulsivity 
  
  0.065 0.047 
   
  (1.40) (0.96) 
Impulsivity x token treatment 
  
   -0.025  -0.021 
   
  (0.40) (0.33) 
Impulsivity x cash treatment 
  
  -0.150** -0.123** 
   
  (2.45) (1.97) 
Male 
 
-0.219**  -0.187* 
 
-0.196* 
  
(2.14)  (1.76) 
 
(1.87) 
Age 
 
0.035**  0.036** 
 
0.030** 
  
(2.44)  (2.38) 
 
(2.10) 
Constant 1.562*** 0.916*** 1.686*** 0.963*** 1.234*** 0.788* 
 
(17.00) (2.79) (14.57) (2.64) (4.48) (1.88) 
lnalpha 
-
0.817*** 
-
0.907*** 
-
0.880*** 
-
0.965*** 
-
0.891*** 
-
0.960*** 
  (3.65) (3.91) (-3.87) (-4.09) (-3.74) (-3.93) 
n 180 180 180 180 180 180 
Pseudo r-squared 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.014 0.007 0.013 
 
Note: absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors; * = p < 0.1,  
** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01.  
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Figure 1. Prediction illustration 
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Figure 2. Predicted values of contribution as a function of self-control 
 
Note: Predicted values are based on specification 4 in Table 4. The effect of male and age are 
evaluated at their means (Male = 0.66, Age = 23.27) and the Rosenbaum score equal to the sample 
mean (M = 18.46), the mean minus one standard deviation (M-SD = 18.46-21.70 = -3.24), and the 
mean plus one standard deviation (M+SD = 18.46+21.70 = 40.16).  
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Figure 3. Predicted values of contribution as a function of impulsivity 
 
Note: Predicted values are based on specification 6 in Table 4. The effect of male and age are 
evaluated at their means (Male = 0.66, Age = 23.27)  and we use values of the Impulsivity score equal 
to the sample mean (M = 4.63), the mean minus one standard deviation (M-SD = 4.63-2.23 = 2.40), 
and the mean plus one standard deviation (M+SD = 4.63+2.23 = 6.86).  
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Appendix B (for review only) 
Instructions for the public goods game* 
1. Baseline Treatment 
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully, as your payoff will depend 
on your decisions made in the experiment.  
Please note that the instructions are your instructions; please do not communicate with other participants. If you 
have questions, please talk directly to the experimenter. If you do not adhere to this rule, you will have to be 
excluded from the experiment.  
Your payoff in this experiment will be denoted in points. The exchange rate is: 
1 Point  =  1 Euro 
 
The Decision Situation 
 
Before you learn the full procedures of the experiment, we would like you to explain the decision situation that 
you are facing. At the end of the explanation you will have opportunity to answer some control questions to 
improve your understanding of the situation. 
You will be member of a group of 4 people. Each member of this group is asked to divide 10 Tokens. You can 
pay these Tokens either into a private or into a public account.  
 
Your Income from the private account 
For each token in the private account you will earn exactly one point. Nobody else receives anything from your 
private account. 
 
Your Income from the public account 
For each token in the public account each group member will receive the same share. Each group member 
receives the following payoff from the public account 
Income from the public account = Sum of all contributions into the public account X 0.4. 
                                                
* Translated from German 
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If for example all members invest 10 tokens each in the public account, then you and the other group members 
receive 40 X 0.4 =16 points from the public account.  
 
Total Income 
Your total income is the sum of the points from the private and the public account 
Total Income = Income from private account + Income from Public account 
 
The Experiment 
In the experiment you will face the aforementioned decision situation. You will do this experiment only once. 
You have ten tokes at your disposal. In this experiment you have to make two types of decisions: we will call 
them conditional and unconditional decisions. 
• For the unconditional contribution, you just have to decide how much you would like to invest in the 
public project 
• For the conditional contribution, you have to decide how much you would like to invest in the public 
project, given the average contribution of the other subjects (rounded to the next higher integer) 
After all participants have made their decisions, a random process determines one member for each group, for 
whom the conditional contribution is relevant. For the other group members, only the unconditional contribution 
is relevant. When you make your decision, you do not know whether you will be chosen; you must therefore 
think about both of your decisions.  
 
The random choice of one member will be determined as follows: Each group member receives a number 
between 1 and 4. One player will roll a 4 sided die. The number will then be entered into the computer. If the 
number drawn corresponds to you number within the group, then your conditional decision is relevant for your 
payoff. Otherwise, your unconditional decision is relevant. 
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2. Changes in the Instructions for the Token and Cash Treatments 
In experimental instructions we added: 
“Please open the envelope in front of you and take out the tokens (money) and two additional envelopes. Please 
put your unconditional contribution in the envelope labeled PUBLIC and the rest in the PRIVATE envelope. 
Please put the envelopes in the box at the entrance when leaving the lab.” 
 
The Rosenbaum Self-Control Schedule 
 
Note: * = item is reverse scored. This is the original English version. The study used a German translation. 
 
Directions - Indicate how characteristic or descriptive each of the following statements is of you by using the 
code given below  
 
+3 very characteristic of me, extremely descriptive  
+2 rather characteristic of me, quite descriptive  
+1 somewhat characteristic of me, slightly descriptive  
-1 somewhat uncharacteristic of me, slightly undescriptive 
-2 rather uncharacteristic of me, quite undescriptive 
-3 very uncharacteristic of me, extremely nondescriptive  
 
 
l. When I do a boring job, I think about the less boring parts of the job and the reward that I will receive 
once I am finished. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
2. When I have to do something that is anxiety arousing for me, I try to visualize how I will overcome my 
anxieties while doing it. 
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     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
3. Often by changing my way of thinking I am able to change my feelings about almost everything. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
4. I often find it difficult to overcome my feelings of nervousness and tension without any outside help.*  
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
5. When I am feeling depressed I try to think about pleasant events. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
6. I cannot avoid thinking about mistakes I have made in the past.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
7. When I am faced with a difficult problem, I try to approach its solution in a systematic way. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
8. I usually do my duties quicker when somebody is pressuring me.*  
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
9. When I am faced with a difficult decision, I prefer to postpone making a decision even if all the facts are 
at my disposal.*  
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
10. When I find that I have difficulties in concentrating on my reading, I look for ways to increase my 
concentration. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
11. When I plan to work, I remove all the things that are not relevant to my work. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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12. When I try to get rid of a bad habit, I first try to find out all the factors that maintain this habit. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
13. When an unpleasant thought is bothering me, I try to think about something pleasant. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
14. If I would smoke two packages of cigarettes a day, I probably would need outside help to stop smoking.*  
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
15. When I am in a low mood, I try to act cheerful so my mood will change. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
16. If I had the pills with me, I would take a tranquilizer whenever I felt tense and nervous.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
 
17. When I am depressed, I try to keep myself busy with things that I like. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
18. I tend to postpone unpleasant duties even if I could perform them immediately.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
19. I need outside help to get rid of some of my bad habits.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
20. When I find it difficult to settle down and do a certain job, I look for ways to help me settle down. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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21. Although it makes me feel bad, I cannot avoid thinking about all kinds of possible catastrophes in the 
future.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
22. First of all I prefer to finish a job that I have to do and then start doing the things I really like. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
23. When I feel pain in a certain part of my body, I try not to think about it. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
24. My self-esteem increases once I am able to overcome a bad habit. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
25. In order to overcome bad feelings that accompany failure, I often tell myself that it is not so catastrophic 
and that I can do something about it. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
26. When I feel that I am too impulsive, I tell myself "stop and think before you do anything." 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
27. Even when I am terribly angry at somebody, I consider my actions very carefully. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
28. Facing the need to make a decision, I usually find out all the possible alternatives instead of deciding 
quickly and spontaneously. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
29. Usually I do first the things I really like to do even if there are more urgent things to do.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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30. When I realize that I cannot help but be late for an important meeting, I tell myself to keep calm. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
31. When I feel pain in my body, I try to divert my thoughts from it. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
32. I usually plan my work when faced with a number of things to do. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
33. When I am short of money, I decide to record all my expenses in order to plan more carefully for the 
future. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
34. If I find it difficult to concentrate on a certain job, I divide the job into smaller segments. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
35. Quite often I cannot overcome unpleasant thoughts that bother me.* 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
 
36. Once I am hungry and unable to eat, I try to divert my thoughts away from my stomach or try to imagine 
that I am satisfied. 
     -3|     -2|     -1|      1|      2|       3 
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Robustness checks 
Table D.4.1. Tobit regression results.  
 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. 
Token treatment -2.123* -2.424** 1.152 0.809 
 (1.82) (2.10) (0.61) (0.44) 
Cash treatment -1.770 -1.888* 4.291** 3.277* 
 (1.60) (1.75) (2.24) (1.73) 
Rosenbaum -0.044 -0.041   
 (1.45) (1.37)   
Rosenbaum × token treatment 0.089** 0.091**   
 (2.14) (2.22)   
Rosenbaum × cash treatment 0.084** 0.071*   
 (2.16) (1.87)   
Impulsivity   0.503* 0.410 
   (1.90) (1.57) 
Impulsivity × token treatment   -0.292 -0.279 
   (0.78) (0.76) 
Impulsivity × cash treatment   -1.014*** -0.864** 
   (2.61) (2.26) 
Male  -1.309*  -1.402* 
  (1.84)  (1.95) 
Age  0.205**  0.168** 
  (2.50)  (2.04) 
Constant 5.681*** 1.895 2.399* 0.030 
 (6.79) (0.93) (1.71) (0.01) 
N 180 180 180 180 
pseudo R2 0.009 0.020 0.009 0.018 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table D.4.1. OLS regression results.  
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Var.: Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. Contrib. 
Token treatment -1.331 -1.557* 0.678 0.432 
 (1.55) (1.92) (0.45) (0.28) 
Cash treatment -1.121 -1.228 3.300** 2.569* 
 (1.43) (1.62) (2.21) (1.66) 
Rosenbaum × token treatment 0.059* 0.061**   
 (1.97) (2.07)   
Rosenbaum × cash treatment 0.060** 0.052*   
 (2.23) (1.88)   
Rosenbaum -0.031 -0.029   
 (1.43) (1.34)   
Impulsivity   0.335 0.271 
   (1.48) (1.18) 
Impulsivity × token treatment   -0.155 -0.144 
   (0.52) (0.49) 
Impulsivity × cash treatment   -0.755** -0.645** 
   (2.55) (2.17) 
Male  -0.857*  -0.933* 
  (1.69)  (1.88) 
Age  0.159***  0.132** 
  (2.79)  (2.35) 
Constant 5.365*** 2.335* 3.147*** 1.127 
 (8.96) (1.68) (2.61) (0.60) 
n 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.039 0.092 0.048 0.091 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *= p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01; robust standard 
errors. 
 
 
